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The Admissibility of Hearsay in Public
Secondary School Disciplinary Hearings
Lynn M. Engelt
Accused, a high school senior, receives notice that she and her
parents must attend a hearing before the school board regarding
an allegation that she sold drugs on the school grounds. Accused
appears before the board on the appointed day. The school princi-
pal testifies that two students informed him that they had wit-
nessed Accused selling drugs to other students. The principal does
not reveal the identity of these informers. Accused is permitted to
refute the charge, but the board finds Accused's refutation unsatis-
factory. Consequently, the board expels Accused from school. Ac-
cused never returns to high school and does not complete her high
school education.
Reliance on hearsay evidence in school disciplinary hearings is
troubling. Use of hearsay testimony as evidence presents questions
regarding the informers' sincerity, memory, perception and narra-
tion. The informers may have fabricated the charge against Ac-
cused for such reasons as malice, prejudice or jealousy. Similar fac-
tors may have motivated the principal to manufacture the story.
However, as in most school disciplinary hearings, Accused was
given no opportunity to question either the principal or the
informers.
Even if the informers are not lying, questions regarding their
perception and memory still may exist. Perhaps the informing stu-
dents saw Accused passing unidentifiable objects to her fellow stu-
dents. The informers may simply have assumed drugs were being
sold based on the reputation of Accused or the fellow students.
How can the school board know that the informers were standing
close enough to see that the objects were drugs? Moreover, how
can the board be sure the informers were close enough to correctly
identify Accused as being present? The informers' memories may
also have been shaky depending on how much time passed between
the incident in question and their report to the principal.
t B.A. 1987, Oberlin College; J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Chicago.
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Finally, the principal may have misunderstood the story told
by the informers. For example, the principal may have misinter-
preted expressions used by them. Moreover, even where the princi-
pal believes he accurately summarized their statements, he may in
fact have misperceived the informers' words due to his own as-
sumptions about Accused. This would be of particular concern if
Accused has a reputation as a troublemaker.
In a high school where school authorities are determined to do
everything possible to safeguard Accused's rights, the scenario is
entirely different. A formal hearing is held and Accused is permit-
ted to have counsel represent her. She is also given the protection
afforded by the rules of evidence. Both student and faculty wit-
nesses are called to testify. Without explanation, one of the in-
formers refuses to appear before the board. On cross-examination
by Accused's counsel, the other informer testifies that her former
boyfriend is now dating Accused, raising doubts about the in-
former's sincerity. At the close of the hearing, Accused's counsel
asserts that the evidence is insufficient to expel Accused. The
school authorities agree and Accused is not expelled. The hearing
has cost the school money and has disrupted the student body and
the faculty. Two weeks later, several students see a different stu-
dent selling drugs. This time, aware of the formal and disruptive
nature of an expulsion hearing, the students do not report what
they have seen. Unfortunately, the procedural safeguards that pro-
tected Accused's rights have also chilled school discipline.
The United States Supreme Court stated in Goss v Lopez'
that a public education guaranteed under state law is a property
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court held that where a student was suspended
for ten, or fewer days, due process required that the student be
given notice of the charges and an opportunity to present his or
her own side of the story.2 The Court speculated that longer sus-
pensions or expulsions might necessitate "more formal proce-
dures."' The Court, however, did not specify what "more formal
procedures" would entail.
Since the Goss decision, lower courts have set varying stan-
dards for what process is due in instances of long-term suspension
and expulsion. The admissibility of hearsay testimony in public
school disciplinary hearings is controversial in these cases. When
' 419 US 565, 574-76 (1975).
' Id at 581.
3 Id at 584.
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confronted with this question, most courts have held that hearsay
is admissible.4
This Comment argues that the importance of high school edu-
cation should tip the balance the other way in all but a small num-
ber of cases. The accused student's property interest in an educa-
tion is substantial and justifies a more formal approach to
disciplinary hearings. Excluding hearsay in high school disciplinary
hearings is consistent with the specific due process principles and
practical concerns advanced by the Supreme Court. Also, by safe-
guarding Due Process, fair hearings minimize the potentially life-
altering, negative consequences of expulsion or long-term
suspension.
Part I of this Comment discusses the importance of obtaining
an education and the possible negative ramifications that unjust
expulsion or long-term suspension may have on a student. Part II
reviews Supreme Court precedent regarding due process in general,
as well as in the school setting. This part concludes that the Su-
preme Court's approach to students' constitutional protections
most likely would lead the Court to decide that excluding hearsay
from school disciplinary hearings is not constitutionally-mandated.
Part III discusses state statutory language that effectively mini-
mizes the use of hearsay testimony in school expulsion hearings.
Part IV discusses the primary policy rationales presented by many
courts in holding hearsay admissible in school disciplinary hearings
and argues that these are insufficient to warrant the use of hearsay.
Finally, Part V recommends a policy-oriented rule that makes
hearsay inadmissible in school disciplinary hearings, with a limited
exception for those cases in which the informing party has a legiti-
mate fear of reprisal if he testifies against the accused student.
I. HARM TO THE UNJUSTLY PUNISHED STUDENT
Approximately 30 percent of entering high school freshmen
quit school.5 A significant percentage of dropouts never complete
" See Tasby v Estes, 643 F2d 1103 (5th Cir 1981); Brewer v Austin Indep. School Dist.,
779 F2d 260 (5th Cir 1985); Newsome v Batavia Local School Dist., 842 F2d 920 (6th Cir
1988); Brands v Sheldon Community School, 671 F Supp 627 (N D Iowa 1987); Racine
Unified School Dist. v Thompson, 107 Wis 2d 657, 321 NW2d 334 (1982); Sykes v Sweeney,
638 F Supp 274 (E D Mo 1986).
' Terrel H. Bell, The Great School Dropout Plague, Chicago Tribune 1-13 (Jan 17,
1989). Mr. Bell served as the U.S. Secretary of Education during the early years of the
Reagan administration. This article was adapted from his remarks after accepting the 1988
Harold W. McGraw, Jr., Prize in Education.
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their high school education or receive an equivalency certificate.'
Moreover, a recent study-suggests that fewer high school dropouts
are seeking high school equivalency diplomas.'
Suspension or expulsion may contribute to a student's failure
to complete high school. It is reasonable to assume that a student
who is unmotivated will be among those most likely to be expelled
or suspended. Such students are least likely to re-enroll following a
suspension or expulsion, particularly if they perceive the discipli-
nary process to be unjust. Even if they do re-enroll, the time spent
away from school may impede their academic progress, causing
them to fall behind their peers.'
The negative economic repercussions for a student who does
not complete high school are sobering. Education provides gradu-
ates with better employment opportunities, jobs that are less sensi-
tive to economic conditions, higher earnings, and better opportuni-
ties to participate in employer-provided training.' In addition,
education generates greater interest and participation in civic af-
fairs, better health and reduced criminal behavior.10 Not surpris-
ingly, job opportunities for high school graduates are consistently
better than those available for high school dropouts.1
See Laurence T. Ogle and Nabeel Alsalam, eds, 1 The Condition of Education 20-21
(National Center for Education, 1990). The proportion of dropouts was 17.3 percent for the
sophomore class of 1980. Four years later, 9.3 percent had still not received a high school
diploma or equivalency certificate. See also Thomas D. Snyder, ed, Digest of Education
Statistics 106 (National Center for Education Statistics, 25th ed 1989). In October 1980,
15.9 percent of all 20 and 21 year olds were dropouts. In October 1986, 13.9 percent of 25 to
29 year olds were dropouts.
See Study: Fewer high school dropouts seeking GED, Chicago Tribune 1-12 (Oct 22,
1990). In 1989, seven percent fewer dropouts took the equivalency test than in 1988. This
article was adapted from a study conducted by the American Council on Education.
6 Research suggests that students who fail to keep pace with their class are more likely
to drop out of school. See Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development, Turning Points:
Preparing American Youth for the Twenty-First Century (Carnegie Corporation of New
York, 1989).
Ogle & Alsalam, eds, The Condition of Education at 38.
10 Id.
"I See Snyder, ed, Digest of Education Statistics at 363 (cited in note 6). The March
1988 unemployment rate for those sixteen and older who had one to three years of high
school education was 13.3 percent compared with 6.4 percent for those with four years of
high school education. Moreover, the median income in 1986 for men 25 to 34 years old with
one to three years of high school education was $11,904; for women in the same age group,
with one to three years of high school education, the median income was $5,305. The median
income in 1986 for men in this age group who had completed high school was $17,551; for
women in the same age group who had completed high school, the median income was
$8,378. In 1986, the poverty line for a family of four was $11,203. Low-income Renters Left
with Few Options, Chicago Tribune CIO (Dec 26, 1987).
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Even if a suspended or expelled student completes high
school, the suspension or expulsion may limit his or her higher ed-
ucation opportunities and inhibit his or her progress. If two stu-
dents have otherwise equal qualifications, the student who has
been suspended or expelled would probably be less likely to gain
admission to a college or a university than the student whose rec-
ord is free from such blemishes. Moreover, college graduates gener-
ally have better job opportunities than those available to high
school graduates.12 In today's job market, because the demand for
high school educated workers appears to be shrinking, the poten-
tial negative consequences of an unjust suspension or expulsion
may be magnified.13
The detrimental effects of suspension or expulsion have led
some schools to develop alternative, in-school suspension pro-
grams. In these programs, teachers can insure that the student
continues her educational progress while simultaneously counseling
the student regarding her unacceptable behavior." However, in-
school suspensions do not remedy the problem of unjust discipli-
nary proceedings. Although this type of suspension minimizes the
negative effects of unjust suspension, it fails to assure just results
in long-term suspension hearings, and it does nothing to mitigate
the risk of unjust expulsion.
II. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS AND PRINCIPLES ADVANCED BY THE
SUPREME COURT
A. General Due Process
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
Due Process Clause places certain limits on the allocation and
means of distributing statutory entitlements. 5 In addition, the Su-
Snyder, ed, Digest of Educational Statistics at 363. The March 1988 unemployment
rate for those with four or more years of college was 1.9 percent. This is a substantial differ-
ence from the unemployment figures listed in note 11.
' See, for example, Job Market Tighter, More Demanding, Boston Globe NH12 (Dec
31, 1989); Lagging Education May Cost Georgians Jobs, Atlanta Journal A5 (July 15, 1989).
1 See, Randy Gordon, Planning/Evaluating Report for In-school Suspensions Grades
6-12 (June 1990). See also, Snyder, ed, Digest of Education Statistics at 134. Of the 29.9
occurrences of suspension per 100 students, 9.9 of these involved an in-school alternative to
suspension.
15 See Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254 (1970). The Supreme Court held that due process
requires that a welfare recipient be given notice and a hearing before benefits can be termi-
nated. The Court held that the recipient must also be given an opportunity to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses relied on by the welfare department in proceedings to terminate
the recipient's benefits. The Court reasoned that the interest of the eligible welfare recipient
in uninterrupted public assistance coupled with the state's interest in ensuring that his pay-
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preme Court has emphasized that due process requirements must
be flexible.'" Consequently, the Court tailors due process require-
ments to "such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands."'"
In determining what process is due, the Court engages in a
balancing test. The Court formalized this test in Mathews v El-
dridge,' enumerating three factors that must be considered:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the offi-
cial action; second, . . . the probable value, if any, of ad-
ditional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including . . . the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail.'9
In Mathews, the Court held that due process, as defined by
this balancing test, does not require an evidentiary hearing before
a state agency can terminate a recipient's Social Security disability
benefits. First, the Court determined that the private interest af-
fected by an erroneous termination of disability benefits is low be-
cause the eligibility for disability benefits is not based on financial
need.2 Second, the Court decided that the potential value of an
evidentiary hearing prior to terminating benefits would be small
since the decision whether to discontinue the benefits will normally
turn on "routine, standard and unbiased medical reports."'" Fi-
nally, the Court decided that the administrative and fiscal burdens
of requiring evidentiary hearings in these cases would far outweigh
any gain to the disability benefit recipient.22
B. Due Process in the Schools
The Supreme Court has significantly qualified due process re-
quirements for students by broadening the factors comprising the
state interest and construing the private interest more narrowly.
Just as in Mathews, the Court has consistently determined how
much process is due by balancing private and state interests. How-
ments not be erroneously terminated, outweighed the state's competing concern to prevent
any increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens.
10 Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471, 481 (1972).
17 Id.
"S 424 US 319 (1976).
" Id at 335.
"0 Id at 340-43.
"1 Id at 344, citing Richardson v Perales, 402 US 389, 404 (1971).
" Mathews, 424 US at 347-48.
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ever, the Court has expanded the number of state interest compo-
nents. In addition to the fiscal and administrative burden further
safeguards entail, the Court also considers the importance of main-
taining discipline within the school setting. By contrast, in evaluat-
ing the private interest at stake, the Court has been more willing
to deny a student full procedural due process where common law
or statutory remedies exist. For the Court, the availability of these
remedies has tended to tip the balance against providing full pro-
cedural protection of students' constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court, in Tinker v Des Moines School Dist.,"
acknowledged that a student in the school setting is a "person"
entitled to constitutional rights. In Tinker, the Court struck down
a school regulation prohibiting students from wearing armbands to
protest government policy in Vietnam. The Court stated:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be en-
claves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess
absolute authority over their students. Students in school
as well as out of school are "persons" under our Constitu-
tion. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the
State must respect, just as they themselves must respect
their obligations to the State. 4
This decision signalled a significant departure from the com-
mon law view of the legal status of minors summarized by the Su-
preme Court in In re Gault2 5 In Gault, the Court stated that
under the common law, the nature of the state-child relationship
was "custodial" and thus, the school could not. "deprive the child
of any rights, because he ha[d] none."20
Although subsequent Supreme Court decisions have expanded
the list of recognized constitutional rights for students, the Court
has never granted students constitutional rights co-extensive with
those of adults. In Goss v Lopez, the Court held that although a
student's statutory entitlement to public education is a property
interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, a student can be suspended for disciplinary
matters if minimum due process requirements are satisfiedY.2 In
actions resulting in suspension of ten or fewer days, due process
$3 393 US 503 (1969).
Id at 511.
" 387 US 1 (1967).
26 Id at 17.
2 419 US 565, 574 (1975).
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requires only that the student be given notice of the charges and
an opportunity to present the student's own side of the story. 8 In
so holding, the Court stated:
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause to
require, countrywide, that hearings in connection with
short suspensions must afford the student the opportu-
nity to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine wit-
nesses supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses
to verify his version of the incident. Brief disciplinary
suspensions are almost countless. To impose in each such
case even truncated trial-type procedures might well
overwhelm administrative, facilities in many places and,
by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in
educational effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing
the suspension process and escalating its formality and
adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a
regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness
as part of the teaching process. 9
Because Goss involved suspensions of ten or fewer days, the
Court implied that a more formal process, such as the opportunity
to secure counsel and to confront adverse witnesses, might be re-
quired when the student faces a long-term suspension or
expulsion.%
More recently, the Supreme Court reiterated the importance
of both avoiding additional administrative burdens and maintain-
ing discipline within the schools. In New Jersey v TLO, 1 the
Court confronted the issue of how the Fourth Amendment prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to students
at a public high school. The Court stressed the need to balance the
students' "legitimate expectations of privacy with the school's
equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which
learning can take place." 32 Thus, the Court eased the restrictions
to which public officials would otherwise be subject outside the
school environment and held that: (1) school officials need not ob-
tain a warrant before searching a student,33 and (2) school officials
26 Id at 581.
"g Id at 583.
31 Id at 584.
31 469 US 325 (1985).
11 Id at 340.
33 Id.
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could base searches only on reasonableness, rather than on proba-
ble cause.34
The Court concluded that the reasonableness standard would
not be overly burdensome to school officials because they would
only have to conform their conduct to reason and common sense,
rather than on the factors that constitute probable cause.3" Addi-
tionally, the Court stated this standard would "ensure that the in-
terests of students [would] be invaded no more than is necessary to
achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools."3"
The Supreme Court has also indicated that where common
law or statutory remedies are available to curb the infringement of
a student's constitutional rights, further procedural protection is
not necessary. In Ingraham v Wright, the Supreme Court held that
the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
did not extend to students who faced corporal punishment as a
means of school disciplinary matters.3 " The Court conducted a Ma-
thews-type analysis and held that, although corporal punishment
in public schools implicated a constitutionally protected liberty in-
terest, the traditional common law constraints and remedies pro-
vided an adequate level of due process.3 " The Court stated that
In any deliberate infliction of corporal punishment...
there is some risk that the intrusion on the child's liberty
will be unjustified and therefore unlawful. In these cir-
cumstances the child has a strong interest in procedural
safeguards that minimize the risk of wrongful punish-
ment and provide for the resolution of disputed ques-
tions of justification.39
The Court, however, decided that safeguards under the appli-
cable state law were sufficient. These safeguards included: (1) the
principal and the teacher determined together whether corporal
punishment was reasonably necessary; (2) any excessive punish-
ment could have resulted in the school authorities being liable for
damages and subject to criminal penalties; (3) evidence indicated
" Id at 341.
" TLO, 469 US at 342-43.
Id at 343. See, for discussion, Note, Using the Reasonable Suspicion Standard to
Maintain a Proper Educational Environment to Educate Today's Youth-New Jersey v
TLO, 13 N Ky L Rev 253 (1986); Note, School Searches Under the Fourth Amendment:
New Jersey v TLO, 72 Cornell L Rev 368 (1987).
" 430 US 651 (1977).
" Id at 682-83.
' Id at 676.
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that the instances of abuse were rare; and (4) punishment was usu-
ally inflicted in response to behavior directly observed by teachers,
and therefore, the risk that the child would be paddled without
cause was typically insignificant."0
The Ingraham Court determined that the costs of additional
procedural safeguards, such as notice and a hearing, would far out-
weigh the benefits.' 1 The Court stated that the costs of informal
hearings would include "time, personnel and diversion of attention
from normal school pursuits.' '2 The Court also expressed the con-
cern that teachers might rely on less effective disciplinary mea-
sures rather than comply with heightened procedural
requirements.'
The Supreme Court has had a number of opportunities to re-
affirm its decision in Tinker, that students' constitutional rights
are not "shed . . .at the schoolhouse gate."" However, Goss, TLO
and Ingraham indicate that the Court continues to adhere to some
remnant of the common law view.. Although the Court considered
the student interest in these cases, the Court emphasized the state
interest more than it would in cases not involving students." Thus,
in most cases the Court will hold that maintaining discipline and
preventing additional administrative and fiscal burdens substan-
tially outweighs any private interest. Given these concerns, it is
unlikely that the Court would hold that excluding hearsay from
school disciplinary hearings is constitutionally mandated by the
Due Process Clause.'6
III. THE INADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY BASED UPON STATE
STATUTORY LANGUAGE
At least one court has held hearsay inadmissible based upon
state statutory provisions. A California statute governing the use of
evidence in expulsion hearings states:
Technical rules of evidence shall not apply to such hear-
ing, but evidence may be admitted and given probative
effect only if it is the kind of evidence upon which rea-
40 Id at 676-80.
41 Ingraham, 430 US at 680-82.
41 Id at 680-81.
48 Id.
11 Tinker v Des Moines School Dist., 393 US 503, 506 (1969).
4 Compare, for example, Goss v Lopez, 419 US, 565 (1975) and Goldberg v Kelly, 397
US 254 (1970).
" See text accompanying notes 59-76.
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sonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of
serious affairs. A decision of the governing board to expel
must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.'
In John A. v San Bernardino City Unified School Dist.,'8 the
California Supreme Court held that "a reasonable person in the
conduct of serious affairs [would] not rely solely on written state-
ments."' 9 In John A., a student accused of assaulting two other
students was expelled after a hearing. The decision to expel the
student was based in part upon signed statements from the other
students who were allegedly involved in the altercation.50 The
chairperson of the hearing panel read the student statements into
the record."' None of the witnesses testified directly.52
The court held that a reasonable person would demand that
witnesses testify directly so that their credibility could be tested
and their testimony weighed against conflicting evidence.53 The
court, applying this standard, found that because the evidence was
challenged by the accused student and the witnesses were readily
available, the use of hearsay evidence was impermissible.5 More-
over, the court held that after excluding the hearsay, the decision
to expel was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 5
The court held that California law did not always preclude the use
of written evidence, but it did limit the use of such hearsay to
cases where disclosure of the witnesses' identities would subject
them to a "significant and specific risk of harm."5
This statute, as interpreted by the court in John A., balances
the student's and the state's interests more effectively than those
courts that hold hearsay admissible.5 7 The California statute allevi-
ates the administrative and fiscal burden by using fewer technical
rules of evidence. In addition, the statute insures that the accused
47 Cal Evid Code, § 48914(0 (West 1990).
' 33 Cal 3d 301 (1982).
" Id at 307.
Id at 304-05.
51 Id.
" John A., 33 Cal 3d at 305.
" Id at 307-08.
Id at 308.
" Id.
"John A., 33 Cal 3d at 308.
" See, for example, Tasby v Estes, 643 F2d 1103 (5th Cir 1981); Brewer v Austin In-
dep. School Dist., 779 F2d 260 (5th Cir 1985); Newsome v Batavia Local School Dist., 842
F2d 920 (6th Cir 1988); Brands v Sheldon Community School, 671 F Supp 627 (N D Iowa
1987); Racine United School Dist. v Thompson, 107 Wis 2d 657, 321 NW2d at 334 (1982);
Sykes v Sweeney, 638 F Supp 274 (E D Mo 1986).
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student's interest will be protected by allowing only that evidence
"upon which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the con-
duct of serious affairs"5 8 and by basing the decision to expel upon
a preponderance of such evidence. Moreover, the statute protects
the informant who is at particular risk of harm.
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR EXCLUDING HEARSAY
A rule demanding that hearsay be excluded from disciplinary
hearings helps guarantee the .trustworthiness of the testimony and
thereby protects a student's property interest in education. If the
informers tell their story at the hearing, school authorities will be
better able to assess the informers' credibility. The informers'
presence will also give the school authorities an opportunity to
question the informers. In addition, testifying at a hearing might
impress upon the informers the seriousness of their allegations and
the importance of telling the truth. Finally, knowing the identity
of the informers could be critical to the accused student's ability to
effectively refute a charge. This would be true particularly if a
prior relationship between the accused and the informers helps to
explain any possible bias or motive the informers may have in
making their allegation.
Nevertheless, most courts have held that hearsay is admissible
in school disciplinary hearings. 59 These courts present either one or
both of the following rationales for their decisions: (1) the adminis-
trative and/or fiscal burden of excluding hearsay is too high; and
(2) an accusing party may be so afraid of reprisal that he may be
unwilling to testify at the disciplinary hearing. However, many of
these courts have overemphasized the risks faced by witnesses and
school officials.
A. Administrative and Fiscal Burdens
Most courts that allow hearsay in school disciplinary hearings
argue that school authorities should not have to conform to the
technicalities of ruling on the admissibility of evidence. These
courts reason that allowing cross-examination and confrontation of
witnesses would be time-consuming and complicated.
8 Cal Evid Code, § 48914(f).
8 See, for example, Tasby, 643 F2d 1103; Brewer, 779 F2d 260; Newsome, 842 F2d 920;
Brands, 671 F Supp 627; Racine, 107 Wis 2d 657, 321 NW2d 334; Sykes, 638 F Supp 274.
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In Boykins v Fairfield Bd. of Educ.,60 a number of students
were suspended for boycotting classes. The principal presented evi-
dence against the boycott participants, including reports that he
had received from other students." The court held "that the rights
at stake in a school disciplinary hearing may be fairly determined
upon the 'hearsay' evidence of the school administrators charged
with the duty of investigating the incidents," arguing that school
boards should not have to apply common law rules of evidence.2
In so holding, the court stated that any other result would be "a
step away" from the due process required for a criminal trial.6 3
Although Boykins pre-dates Goss, numerous decisions since
Goss have relied on Boykins for authority.6 4 For example, in
Brewer v Austin Indep. School Dist.,65 the court emphasized the
high burden imposed on school administrators by even informal
notice and hearing requirements. The court stated:
We decline to escalate the formality of the suspension
process even further by requiring school administrators
to provide a fact hearing as to the accuracy of each bit of
evidence considered in determining the appropriate
length of the punishment . ... e
A number of factors may be involved in the courts' determina-
tions that administrative and fiscal burdens are too high to hold
hearsay inadmissible. One factor underlying many of these deci-
sions may be the courts' shared belief that the accused students
truly are guilty of the misconduct of which they are accused. In
Brewer, for example, the record contained evidence that upon the
principal's request to see the contents of the accused student's
492 F2d 697, 699 (5th Cir 1974).
61 Id at 700-01.
61 Id at 701.
63 Id.
" See Tasby, 643 F2d at 1106 ("rights in a student disciplinary hearing may properly
be determined upon the hearsay evidence of school administrators who investigate discipli-
nary infractions"); Newsome, 842 F2d at 925 ("[w]e hold that the burden of cross-examina-
tion on the administration of school discipline outweighs the benefits to be derived from
that procedure"); Sykes, 638 F Supp at 279 ("The courts have consistently declined to im-
pose the formal procedures and rules of evidence which govern court trials on student disci-
plinary proceedings."); Brands, 671 F Supp-at 632 ("the Due Process Clause does not re-
quire courtroom standards of evidence to be used in administrative hearings") (relying on
FCC v Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 US 134, 143 (1940)); Racine, 107 Wis 2d 657, 321
NW2d at 337-38 ("We agree with the fifth circuit's statement that a lay board cannot be
expected to observe the niceties of the hearsay rule.").
48 779 F2d 260, 262-63 (5th Cir 1985).
" Id at 263.
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pocket, the student removed a bottle of marijuana and a pipe
hose. 7 Presumably, this made credible anonymous accusations
that the student was smoking marijuana and selling drugs on cam-
pus. 8 However, in cases such as Brewer, where hearsay evidence is
supported by physical evidence obtained by testifying school offi-
cials, the court does not need to focus on the administrative bur-
den of excluding hearsay. In Brewer, for example, even if the hear-
say evidence was inadmissible, it is likely that the possession
evidence, obtained through a constitutional search of the student,
would have been sufficient to warrant suspension.
A second factor may be that some courts assume that hearsay
evidence is more reliable if the informing party has been
"screened" by a school official. In Newsome v Batavia Local
School Dist., the plaintiff was expelled for allegedly "possessing
and offering a marijuana cigarette for sale on high school prop-
erty."69 At the expulsion hearing, the school principal and superin-
tendent simply recounted the substance of the accusations made
by two students.7 In allowing the use of hearsay, the court stated
that "the value of cross-examination in school disciplinary cases is
...somewhat muted" because the veracity of a student's accusa-
tion is: (1) "initially assessed by a school administrator ...who
has, or has available to him, a particularized knowledge of the [ac-
cusing] student's trustworthiness . . .[and (2)] the school adminis-
trator often knows, or can readily discover, whether the student
witness and the accused have had an amicable relationship in the
past."7' The court therefore concluded that cross-examining the
student witness might be "merely duplicative of the evaluation
process undertaken by the investigating school administrator. 72
The Newsome court's analysis, however, is flawed. The trust-
worthiness of an informing student may be difficult to ascertain.
Simply because the student's record does not indicate a problem
with unreliability or untrustworthiness does not mean that the stu-
dent will be trustworthy in the instant situation. It may be
equally-or perhaps more-difficult to assess the impact of the re-
lationship between the informing student and the accused. Absent
convincing proof to the contrary, evidence suggesting a past rela-
67 Id at 261.
68 Id.
" 842 F2d 920, 921 (6th Cir 1988).
70 Id.
71 Id at 924.
7* Id.
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tionship-or even no relationship-may be irrelevant to the truth
or falsity of the informer's allegations.
The court's analysis also mistakenly assumes that the investi-
gating school administrator will have an interest equal to that of
the accused student in exploring and examining the basis for the
student informer's accusation. The court fails to consider the pos-
sibility that the investigating school administrator may bring in
personal, albeit perhaps unconscious, biases about the actual be-
havior of the accused. Thus, even if the informing student is sin-
cere, there are still dangers of memory, perception, and narration
that the accused student, or her counsel, could explore through
cross-examination.
A third factor possibly influencing these decisions is that some
courts presume that, where the informing party is a school official,
the hearsay testimony is reliable." This presumption, however,
may not always be valid. Presuming the school official is sincere,
like the student informer, the official's testimony is still subject to
the hearsay dangers of faulty memory, perception, and narration.
If the courts believe that either a student is guilty of the al-
leged misbehavior based upon nonhearsay evidence and/or that a
school official supplies added veracity to the hearsay testimony,
the conclusion that the administrative and fiscal burdens of hold-
ing hearsay inadmissible would outweigh any benefit to the stu-
dent's case is somewhat understandable. However, a student facing
long-term suspension or expulsion has a considerable property in-
terest at stake. The student's guilt or innocence should therefore
be determined through a fair and thorough fact-finding process.
Allowing hearsay testimony could seriously inhibit this process.
Moreover, so long as school authorities are not required to ap-
ply technical rules of evidence, administrative and fiscal burdens
will not be greatly increased by excluding hearsay. The increase in
fiscal and administrative burdens imposed by requiring an accus-
ing party to testify directly at a disciplinary hearing is relatively
low. Even at large public high schools, the circumstances in which
school authorities find alleged misconduct so severe as to warrant a
long-term suspension or expulsion are relatively infrequent. 74 In
73 See Racine United School Dist. v Thompson, 107 Wis 2d 657, 321 NW2d 334, 338
(1982). The court found that absent an allegation of bias by the accused student, there was
no reason to find the hearsay testimony of the school staff inadmissible since there was "no
reason why [the] school staff would fabricate or misrepresent statements of this sort."
" In 1986, the U.S. Department of Education estimated the expulsion rate for 1983-84
in public secondary schools to be 0.3 percent. Suspension for disciplinary reasons was ten
percent. However, this percentage does not distinguish between short-term (ten or fewer
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those cases in which the school authorities determine that such
punishment might be warranted, a substantial percentage of these
students would probably resign themselves to the administration's
disposition of the case rather than challenge school authorities.75
Further, many disciplinary cases depend on documentary evidence,
as, for example, in instances of expulsion or suspension for tru-
ancy.7 Finally, full-scale hearings will not be required in all cases
in which hearsay is excluded. School authorities can rely on physi-
cal evidence to justify disciplinary action if such evidence is
available.
B. Testifying Students' Fear of Reprisal
Some courts have expressed concern that student informers
who are forced to testify could face reprisals from other students.
For example, the Newsome court noted that in a school environ-
ment, students who have witnessed misconduct by other students
may be afraid to report it to school authorities, fearing ostracism
or physical reprisal.77 The court concluded that although the stu-
dent who was accused of serious misconduct had an "important
interest" in his public education, the need to protect student in-
formers from ostracism and reprisal outweighed the incremental
value to the fact-finding process of allowing the accused student to
cross-examine the informers.78
The concern that informers might be afraid openly to confront
the accused is reasonable. No student wants to be labelled or per-
ceived by other students as someone who is willing to report mis-
behavior to school authorities. In addition, in some situations there
days) and long-term (more than ten days) suspensions. Thus, the long-term suspension per-
centage is probably less than ten percent. Snyder, ed, Digest of Education Statistics at 134
(cited in note 6). See also Lee T. Teitelbaum, School Discipline Procedures: Some Empiri-
cal Findings and Some Theoretical Questions, 58 Ind L J 547, 562-63 (1983). A study of
fifteen Indiana high schools in the spring of 1981 indicated that only five schools expelled
"more than one percent of the student population and only one school . . . more than three
percent." Id at 562. Although' these numbers may seem high, it is interesting to note that at
those schools with larger expulsion percentages, truancy was the most frequently cited cause
for the disciplinary action. In such instances, the use of hearsay would probably be unneces-
sary because truancy is usually proven through attendance reports (i.e., documentary evi-
dence). Rarely would a student eyewitness be called upon to testify against truants. Further,
expulsion for truancy is based on repeat offenses, so the majority of evidence supporting the
disciplinary action in these cases is not dependent on hearsay at all.
'5 See, for example, Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vander-
bilt L R 1027 (1969) (discussing these considerations in the context of university students).
" See note 74 and accompanying text.
" Newsome, 842 F2d at 925.
78 Id.
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may be a legitimate fear of physical reprisal. This reluctance to
recount fellow student misbehavior further complicates the already
difficult task of maintaining discipline in schools.
These risks to student informers must be weighed against the
due process concerns of the accused. Protection for student in-
formers can be designed so that it will affect only minimally the
accused's procedural safeguards. For example, a school district
could admit hearsay upon some showing that direct testimony by
the informer would create a danger to witnesses or cause a break-
down in discipline.
V. RECOMMENDED RULES
Rules on hearsay admissibility must balance the need to pro-
tect the accused students' property interests against the impor-
tance of maintaining order within high schools. Courts are properly
wary about intruding upon school officials' authority to discipline
students.79 However, where school disciplinarians act on others' re-
ports and advice and controlling facts are disputed, the "risk of
error is not at all trivial and it should be guarded against if that
may be done without prohibitive cost or interference with the edu-
cational process."8
A standard similar to that set forth in the California statute,
as applied by the court in John A.,"' seems to offer the best bal-
ance between protection for the accused and the need to maintain
order. As noted above, this California statute imposes procedural
safeguards to protect a student's property interest without signifi-
cantly burdening school officials or testifying students.
Recommended rules regarding the admissibility of hearsay in
school disciplinary hearings include the following: (1) technical
rules of evidence should not apply to school disciplinary hearings;
(2) if oral evidence is necessary, witnesses must testify directly and
cross-examination must be allowed; (3) direct testimony will not be
required if it is shown that testifying would endanger the witness;
and (4), if a witness is unwilling to testify because of fear of repri-
79 Interestingly, in a 1989 survey, teachers ranked the three most serious problems in
the schools as lack of parental support and interest, lack of proper financial support, and
lack of pupil interest and repeated truancy. However, in a 1988 survey, the public ranked
the three most serious problems in the schools as drug use, lack of discipline, and lack of
proper financial support. Ogle & Alsalam, eds, The Condition of Education at 74 (cited in
note 6). Comparing the perceptions of the teachers with those of the public may be useful in
understanding courts' perceptions of disciplinary problems in the schools.
80 Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565, 580 (1975).
81 John A. v San Bernardino City Unified School Dist., 33 Cal 3d 301 (1982).
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sal, the disciplinary body should require corroborating evidence to
show that the informing student's reluctance is well-founded
before it admits the hearsay testimony of that student.
These recommended rules fairly balance the interests of the
school with the important property interests of the student. In ad-
dition, setting out a standard that prefers corroborating physical
evidence to hearsay testimony signals school authorities that only
legitimate fears of reprisal justify shielding potential witnesses and
encroaching on the rights of the accused.
CONCLUSION
Even if hearsay is excluded from secondary school disciplinary
hearings, two legitimate concerns remain: (1) the burden on school
administrators, and (2) the informer's fear of reprisal. However,
the importance of the accused student's education makes these ar-
guments less convincing in circumstances in which the student
faces long-term suspension or expulsion.
The policy reasons behind the hearsay rule, unreliability be-
cause of the declarant's sincerity, perception, memory, and narra-
tion faults, are as compelling in a hearing before a school discipli-
nary board as they are in a formal trial. Moreover, the important
property interests at stake in school disciplinary hearings over-
shadow the small administrative and/or fiscal burdens that may re-
sult from requiring informers to testify directly. Because these
hearings are relatively infrequent the increase in administrative or
fiscal burdens will likely be small. Thus, even if direct testimony is
not constitutionally required, most courts give too little weight to
the possible detrimental impact of allowing hearsay-denial of a
high school education and potentially, depriving a student of the
ability to function as a self-sufficient adult. Fairness to students
facing the severe penalty of expulsion or long-term suspension re-
quires that hearsay be excluded from school disciplinary hearings,
unless it can be shown that testifying before the accused will en-
danger the witness.
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